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By Hans Henningsen
Over the past 3 years major changes have taken place in Europe 
- particularly in Eastern Europe, but to a certain extent in the 
western parts of Europe, too. A wave of national revival is 
sweeping Europe. The term »people« is being used again, as was 
the case in Grundtvig’s time. And various European peoples, 
who used to be suppressed or even forgotten, are striving for 
freedom and independence.
But the national and ethnic revival is assuming widely dif­
ferent shapes. What we are witnessing in the southern parts of 
the former Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia are ethnic conflicts. 
Ethnic groups are demanding to be independent and ethnically 
pure. In the Baltic Countries, however, the situation is different. 
Here the battle was not about ethnic purity but national inde­
pendence. In all three countries there was and still is a funda­
mental wish to safeguard the rights of the minorities. Estonians 
emphasize the fact that between the two World Wars minorities 
were treated liberally. In the Baltic countries people are certainly 
keen on establishing societies built on mutual respect between 
themselves and their Russian neighbours.
In all three Baltic countries the population is mixed. 80% of 
the Lithuanians belong there ethnically. About 10 % are emi­
grants from Russia, White Russia or the Ukraine. Some other 10 
% are Polish. About half of the population in Latvia are Russi­
ans, and more than two thirds of the citizens of the capital Riga 
are Russians. In Estonia the Russians make up 40 % of the 
total population.
Few of the Russians speak a Baltic language, and the Balts 
see them as rootless people, who should be clearly distinguished 
from the »genuine Russians« who are acutely conscious of their 
own culture. The »genuine Russians« always constituted a mi­
nority in the Baltic countries, even before 1940. Since 1940 the 
number of Russian emigrants has been steadily increasing.
The many Russian emigrants and soldiers have caused consi­
derable difficulties. However, there have been relatively few
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serious incidents. The Russians and Balts have refrained from 
fighting any ethnic battles. This makes good sense, as in fact 
many Russians living in the Baltic area have voted for complete 
independence for the Baltic countries.
Now, let us turn to Western Europe. Here it has long been cu­
stomary to accentuate the term »people« at the expense of 
»nation« and »nation state«. It is claimed that the nation state 
has outlived itself. The New Europe should be a »Europe of 
Peoples«. The term »nation state« strikes an altogether negative 
chord while »people« has positive associations.
This is surprising in view of the fact that nation states - that 
is the national democracies - have been the stabilizing elements 
whereas most political crimes have been committed in the name 
of the people - in the thirties and even today.
The term »people« is a dangerous term. The scepticism of 
this term in post-war Germany is well-founded. In Denmark 
many people do not realize the demonic powers of this word, 
simply because it has been redefined and »demythologized«, 
thanks to Grundtvig.
When dealing with the »New Europe« it is important that one 
realizes that the ethnic, cultural and linguistic maps of Europe 
do not coincide and never will coincide with the political map. 
The peoples of Europe are intermixed and have all assimilated 
changing numbers of immigrants. It would be totally wrong to 
claim that each people has its own territory; this does not even 
apply to the Danish people. Even in this country there are 
immigrants who share with other Danes the right to be Danish 
and be part of Danish democracy.
No matter how small the entities may be, the regions of 
Europe will inevitably hold minorities - if not a Basque minority 
in France and Spain, then a French and Spanish minority in a 
prospective Basque state. This is how complex things are. A 
similar complexity is found for instance in Armenia or Aserbajds­
jan • and in Northern Ireland, for that matter. Unless undemo­
cratic coercive measures are resorted to, one will have to accept 
the fact that in those areas there will always be minorities, 
irrespective of their political status.
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In Denmark people have been discussing »Danish identity« 
and how to preserve Danish identity and Danish culture in a 
European union. Research has been carried out in the universiti­
es to define these terms. There has been a renewed interest in 
the national history and literature. The political aspects and 
implications, however, seemed to be totally overlooked. Precisely 
that connection between culture and society, culture and politics 
that was taken for granted in the preceding century when our 
forefathers taught history in the first Folk High Schools is now 
ignored.
Well, the idea of preserving different national cultures and 
national languages within the framework of a union is not new 
at all. Basically the Soviets upheld it and it was precisely this 
idea the Balts revolted against. When Mr. Gorbatjov and others 
were speaking about democracy, they didn’t realize that consequ­
ently this would mean that every people should be allowed to 
have their own democracy. The separation of culture from 
politics is impossible to combine with freedom. According to the 
traditional communist way of thinking the union meant progress 
and civilisation. And when the popular fronts insisted on having 
a national flag, a national currency, a national citizenship, a 
national language etc., this evidently meant moving down the 
ladder of evolution. Inevitably, this is how Communists will 
argue. But it is probably true to say that many Eurocrats are 
thinking in basically the same way.
The idea, however, of establishing a supranational democracy 
that may assume responsibilities from national democracy is a 
formal and abstract conception which is certainly closer to a 
technocrat way of thinking than to democracy.
The Balts wanted their own democracy, not a nationalist but 
a national democracy. But even after the movements towards 
national independence had begun and the Soviet Union had 
started to collapse, there was precious little support of the Baltic 
struggle for liberty from the West and from the European Com­
munity. Only a few small countries, among them Denmark, rose 
to the occasion.
As already pointed out, it may be difficult to define such 
terms as »people« and »national identity«. Let us look at anot­
her variant, a conception that is fairly widespread in Denmark.
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In my opinion it is closely related to Grundtvig - and also, I 
think, to the result of the referendum on the 2nd of June last 
year.
According to this conception it makes no sense to distinguish 
between culture and politics. The two should be closely connec­
ted. And it is typical of what we refer to as Danish national 
character that it is largely based on this unity. The Danish 
national character rests on »society culture« rather than any 
other kind of culture. Actually the Folk High School movement, 
the cooperative movement and the working class movement in 
Denmark substituted a society culture for the folk culture. If you 
would disregard the political development and the political 
struggles of the past 150 years, you would disregard the essential 
parts of Danish culture, including such phenomena as Nordic 
Democracy and Nordic Welfare Policies. Danish culture is neit­
her elitarian culture nor folk culture, but most of all society 
culture and political culture.
What applies to Denmark, applies in principle to any demo­
cratic society. In any democracy society culture and political 
culture are of the utmost importance. A refined democracy will 
make it increasingly difficult to distinguish between culture and 
politics. This has obvious implications when it comes to organi­
sing close cooperation between democratic countries.
It is possible, of course, to establish supranational institutions 
based on democratic rules, direct election etc., like the EC 
Parliament, but democracy will not cease to exist primarily as a 
national democracy, a British, a German or a Danish democracy, 
i. e. as part of a national culture. Something like a common 
European culture doesn’t exist, at least not yet, and there is no 
indication that it is being created. It may well be that people in 
Western Europe since June 2nd 1992 are becoming increasingly 
aware of this problem.
In fact Western Europe is dealing with an embarrassing 
dilemma. It doesn’t really matter whether power is transferred to 
the EC Parliament or the Council of Ministers, because in either 
case it will be transferred away from the only genuine democracy 
in Europe, national democracy uniting politics and culture.
When Grundtvig, especially about 1848, was trying to clarify 
the terms »folkelig« and »folk«, he tried out many possible
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definitions, but he left behind him all nationalistic and ethnic 
conceptions and came closer and closer to the conclusion that 
the meaning of »folkelig« was not very far from what he descri­
bed as »living interaction« in the society.
Grundtvig was not a nationalist thinker and historian. On the 
contrary. He always thought of history as the history of mankind. 
His perspective was universal. History was a process of interac­
tion and enlightenment. But, Grundtvig urgently emphasized, 
there is no shortcut of harmonization leading to the universally 
human. His view equally deserves to be termed »folkelig« and 
»inter-folkelig« - or in Danish »mellemfolkelig«.
Grundtvig’s understanding of »folkelig« represents an alterna­
tive to the simplified view of Man and society that dominated 
the Age of Rationalism. To Rationalism historical and cultural 
differences become unessential and trivial incidental circumstan­
ces.
This abstract way of thinking also produced the idea of a 
totally secularized society as well as a number of ideas concer­
ning the development of societies, the need for still bigger 
entities and the discontinuation of the nation state. Such fixed 
ideas are deeply rooted in European tradition in West and East. 
Grundtvig on the other hand accentuates the uniqueness of 
individuals and societies.
Grundtvig tried to avoid the choice between nationalism’s 
narrow view and internationalism’s abstract view of man. This 
was a false alternative, he thought. Just as it does not promote 
understanding and community between individuals if they try to 
eradicate their personality and needs for independence and self- 
-development, so it does not benefit coexistence and cooperation 
among the peoples of the world if we seek to suppress differen­
ces and diversity through harmonization and assimilation. On the 
contrary. In freedom the peoples come closer to one another. 
Or as Grundtvig puts it: the more a people protects its freedom 
and independence, the more fruitful will be the conditions for 
human activity and interaction.
This thesis has played a definitive role in Danish politics - 
domestic and foreign - over the last 100 years. It has been the 
cornerstone of the principle of freedom that prevails in prac­
tically every aspect of our school, church and cultural legislation,
60
of our views on the rights of minorities and the idea of Nordic 
cooperation as a free collaboration among peoples - as opposed 
to the idea of a Nordic Union promoted by the Scandinavism 
movement in the last century. In the Nordic countries the idea 
of a union died more than 100 years ago.
Some people in Denmark feel that the referendum on the 
2nd of June 1992 proved that the Danes are divided in two 
groups that are miles apart. This seems to be a superficial view, 
and it is probably more true to say that there exists an asto­
nishing consensus on fundamental matters. Only a very small 
minority of Danes would like to see a European Community 
developing into a federal state, and few would accept the EC 
Parliament to become a »real« Parliament. These attitudes are 
explicable if viewed in the light of Danish and Nordic democratic 
culture.
Europe’s situation after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
end of the Cold War is unique. Europe is closer than ever to 
European unity. Almost all of the about 50 European countries 
support democracy and want to live in peace and cooperation 
with each other. Of course one should not just accept this 
situation as if it were a piece of good luck. Everything should be 
done to prevent any backlash. The question is, however, if a EC 
Union among 12 countries in Western Europe would be the 
right answer to this challenge. Would a Union that lacks popular 
support guarantee the democratic future of Europe?
